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In the past two decades, nearly every state has expanded its authority and simplified its
procedures to transfer adolescent offenders from juvenile to criminal (adult) courts. As a
result, the use of jurisdictional transfer has grown steadily. These developments reflect
popular and political concerns that punishment in juvenile courts is too lenient for
serious crimes committed by adolescents. Yet there is mixed evidence that expanded
transfer authority has produced more certain or severe punishments for adolescents
prosecuted in criminal courts. Some empirical studies show that adolescents transferred
to criminal court are more likely to be convicted, sentenced to prison, and serve longer
sentences, compared to similar cases that remain in the juvenile court. Other studies
show that transferred cases receive similar sentences or receive less severe punishments.
In this article, we report the results of a natural experiment comparing detention,
disposition and custodial sentence lengths for matched groups of adolescents charged
with serious felony offenses in juvenile or criminal courts. We report that adolescents
prosecuted as adults are at a greater risk of detention and incarceration, and if
incarcerated, sentenced to longer sentences than adolescents in juvenile courts. Yet the
disparity between outcomes in juvenile and criminal courts is not as large as the rhetoric
surrounding this issue would lead one to believe. The resilience of common law doctrine
of diminished culpability of adolescents is evident in the limited effects of expanded
jurisdictional transfer activity on sentencing and punishment of adolescents in criminal
court. We discuss the jurisprudential and social policy implications of denying
adolescents the latitude of a traditionally more rehabilitative and lenient juvenile court.

I. INTRODUCTION
For over two decades, legislatures across the nation have enacted a variety of laws
and policies to criminalize delinquency by relocating adolescent offenders from the
juvenile to the adult court. 1 More recently, the U.S. Congress passed legislation to “get
*
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Keith Bradsher, Fear of Crime Trumps Fear of Lost Youth, NEW YORK TIMES, November 21, 1999.
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tough” on youth crime by promoting the transfer of adolescents to criminal court, and has
provided funds to facilitate state efforts to do the same. 2 This legislation threatens to
accelerate a trend that began with the passage of New York State’s Juvenile Offender
Law in 1978, 3 and continues today even as juvenile crime rates have fallen dramatically. 4
Since 1990, nearly every state and the federal system have expanded the use of adult
adjudication and punishment for adolescent offenders. 5 Some states have expanded the
number of cases eligible for judicial waiver, and still others have reassigned the burden of
proof for waiver hearings from the prosecutor (seeking to waive a case to criminal court)
to the defense counsel (seeking to deny waiver). 6 In some states, legislatures have
excluded specific offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. Other states permit
prosecutorial choice of forum between concurrent jurisdictions. 7
California’s recent enactment of the ‘Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime
Prevention Act’, or Propositio n 21, is typical of both the statutory shifts in the boundary
between juvenile and criminal court and the procedural changes by which cases cross this
boundary. Proposition 21 allows for increased use of transfer to criminal court and
greater prosecutorial control over this practice. Enacted through a voter initiative in
March, 2000, this law lowered the age of eligibility for transfer to criminal court from 16
to 14. It also shifted discretion from judges, who would previously conduct an
investigation to determine if the defendant was amenable to treatment in juvenile court, to
prosecutors who can now directly file cases in criminal court if they meet certain
criteria 8 . Proponents of this initiative claim that it has been made necessary by a rising
tide of juvenile violence and the inadequacy of an outdated juvenile court to deal with
Section 4, p. 3. See, generally, Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin E. Zimring, Editors’ Introduction, in CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE : TRANSFER OF A DOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan and
Franklin E. Zimring, eds.) (2000).
2
Both political parties introduced nearly identical legislation in the 106th Congress that would broaden the
categories of juvenile offenses and offenders eligible for transfer to the criminal court. In S. 254, 106th
Cong. § 1302 (2000) (“Certain Punishment and Graduated Sanctions for Youth Offenders”) calls for
“graduated sanctions” that would require adult punishment after three successive juvenile crimes. This is
akin to a “three strikes” law where transfer occurs after a juvenile reaches a threshold of prior offenses and
offense severity. The bill provides fiscal incentives to the states, via block grants, to implement these
provisions. Similar to S. 10 in the 105th Congress, S. 254 would also eliminate many of the current
protections for separating minors from adults in jails and prisons housing adult inmates.
3
1978 N.Y. Laws. Ch. 478 ' 2. See, Simon Singer, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY (1996). Legislative
distrust of juvenile justice officials prompted passage of the 1978 Juvenile Offender Law, an excludedoffense waiver provision that places certain categories of violent offenses automatically in criminal court.
4
Symposium, Juvenile Justice: Reform after One-Hundred Years, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1409, 1414-15
(2000). See, also, Juan Alberto Arteaga, Juvenile (In)Justice: Congressional Attempts To Abrogate The
Procedural Rights Of Juvenile Defendants, 102 Columbia Law Review 1051 (2002).
5
Arteaga, id. See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS (1999); Franklin E. Zimring, A MERICAN YOUTH
VIOLENCE (1998); FAGAN AND ZIMRING supra note 1.
6
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987); YOUTH IN A DULT COURT : BETWEEN TWO
W ORLDS (Donna M. Hamparian et al. eds., 1982); P. GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS A DULTS IN
CRIMINAL COURT : AN A NALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS (1998); Robert O. Dawson, Judicial
Waiver in Theory and Practice, in FAGAN AND ZIMRING supra note 1.
7
Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusions of Offenses From Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and
Critique, in FAGAN AND ZIMRING supra note 1.
8
Sara Raymond, From Playpens to Prisons: What the Gang Violence and Juvenile crime Prevention Act of
1998 Does to California’s Juvenile Justice System and Reasons to Repeal It, GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW (2000). The criteria for transfer include: an offense that would be punishable by death or life
imprisonment if committed by an adult, the use of a firearm in committing a felony, or accusation that the
youth committed any crime either in conjunction with a street gang, for the purpose of interfering with a
victim’s constitutional rights, or against a victim 65-years-old or older.
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this violence 9 . Yet its critics contend that misleading and error-prone statistics were used
to support this claim, in that juvenile and gang violence actually had been declining in
recent years 10 . Others have criticized the statute as a breach of due process 11 .
Another example of these shifts, at the national level, is HR 1501, the Violent
Juvenile and Repeat Offender Accountability Act of 1999, sponsored by former
Representative Bill McCollum of Florida 12 . Had it been enacted, this act would have
granted federal prosecutors discretion to bypass juvenile court and directly file cases of
defendants aged 14 and older in criminal court or age 13 if approved by the Assistant
Deputy Attorney General. To be eligible, defendants must be arrested for a violent
felony offense or for certain drug offenses. The Act was passed in the House of
Representatives by a margin of 249 to 181 in June, 1999, but subsequently died in
committee due to an attached provision strengthening firearm laws. This Act is
fascinating both for its demonstration of legislators’ willingness to forsake a doctrine of
diminished capacity for criminally offending youth, and for the ambivalence of
legislators who want to crack down on adolescent violence yet not adopt laws restricting
youths’ access to firearms.
The primary focus of Proposition 21, HR 1501, and similar laws is the removal of
adolescent offenders from the juvenile justice system to the criminal courts, in order to
increase the certainty and severity of punishment 13 . Once transferred, other companion
statutes promote harsh punishment for youths convicted in the criminal court: mandatory
minimum terms of secure confinement, mandated confinement in secure settings, and
recently, confinement in adult institutions. 14 Several states have also adopted “blended”
sentencing schemes, allowing for the transfer of adolescents to adult institutions when
they reach age eighteen15 .
9

See Proposition 21, in California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election 119 (March 7, 2000); Pete Wilson,
How is Juvenile Justice Served? SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE February 27, 2000. Proponents of increased
use of transfer provisions claim that juvenile courts were created to deal with shoplifting and truancy, and
are unable to adequately punish violent youth.
10
Barbara Stack White, Is this Justice? The ‘adult time’ law for juveniles hasn’t fulfilled its backers’
promises PITTSBURGH POST -GAZETTE, March 18, 2001; Brian Hansen, Kids in Prison: Are the states too
tough on young offenders? 11 THE CQ RESEARCHER (2001).
11
Raymond, supra note 8. See also George Mgdesyan, Gang Violence and Crime Prevention Act of 1998,
JOURNAL OF LEGAL A DVOCACY & PRACTICE (2001). Critics claim that by transferring all power to choose
jurisdiction to the prosecutor curtails a juvenile’s due procedural safeguards. According to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, prosecutorial waiver is a short cut that streamlines the juvenile justice
process “at the expense of the individual’s right to due procedural safeguards.” (Raymond, supra note 8 at
274). See also Franklin Zimring et al., Amicus Brief for Morgan Victor Manduley et al. vs. the Superior
Court of California, County of San Diego, (Fourth Appellate District Court of Appeal 2001)(Nos.
D036356, D036456). For arguments against breaches of due process in the juvenile court, see Janet E.
Ainsworth, Re-imagning Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the
Juvenile Court, NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW (1991); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court:
Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY (1997).
12
1999 HR 1501; 106, see Title II, sec. 201.
13
Catherine R. Guttman, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court,
HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW (1995); Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy
the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice AMERICAN CRIMINAL
LAW REVIEW (1998); Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society,
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW (1995).
14
See, for example, Cynthia M. Conward, Where Have All the Children Gone: A Look at Incarcerated
Youth in America, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 2435, 2435 (2001).
15
Richard Redding and James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts, in FAGAN AND
ZIMRING supra note 1.
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Choosing the criteria for legal “adulthood” reflects tensions in sentencing policies
between retribution and rehabilitation as well as questions about culpability (criminal
liability) and the risk of continued criminality versus behavioral change. 16 Yet theory and
law may be less important in the current debate on the boundary of juvenile justice than
are popular and political concerns with the perceived leniency of punishment in the
juvenile court. 17 The common law assumed that adolescents are less culpable than adults,
and the juvenile court institutionalized these notions both jurisprudentially and
statutorily. 18 That is, the juvenile court offered a punishment discount for adolescents
punished as juveniles, relative to the punishment given to adults. This discount is rooted
in the belief that serious crimes committed by young offenders may reflect developme ntal
deficiencies in autonomy and social judgment, suggesting a reduction in their culpability
and, in turn, their punishment liability. 19
But for adolescents charged with serious crimes, the principle of penal
proportionality would require more severe punishment than that available in the juvenile
court. 20 For such crimes, the normative demand for punishment requires punitive
responses often beyond the limitations of the juvenile court. 21 Recent developments in
transfer law often express the preference of penal proportionality over the common law
assumptions of reduced culpability of adolescent offenders. 22 In this view, the traditional
preoccupation with rehabilitation in the juvenile court, with its limitations on punishment
opportunities, deprecates the moral seriousness of crimes and offers inadequate
retribution. 23 Proponents of harsher punishments for adolescents argue that punishments
that are disproportionately lenient compared to the severity of the adjudicated offense
also undermine both the specific and general deterrent effects of legal sanctions. 24
16

FAGAN AND ZIMRING, supra note 1.
Putting Consequences Back into Juvenile Justice: Federal, State and Local Efforts: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) [hereinafter House
Hearing II] (statement of Rep. McCollum), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-332a.htm; 143
Cong. Rec. S145 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (commenting that procedural
safeguards afforded to juvenile offenders, such as the confidentiality of juvenile records, "coddl[e]
hardened criminals").
18
Feld, supra note 5.
19
See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts 19 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1995); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, 20 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR
(1996).
20
Franklin E. Zimring, The Law’s Construction of Children’s Culpability, in COMPETENCE , CULPABILITY,
AND YOUTH: TOWARD A COHERENT SYSTEM OF JUVENILE JUSTICE , 271 (Robert Schwartz & Thomas
Grisso eds.) (2000).
21
Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in FAGAN AND ZIMRING supra note 1, at 207.
22
McCollum and Ashcroft statements, supra note 17.
23
See, e.g., FELD, supra note 5.
24
Standards also are unstated with respect to specific versus general deterrence of crime. Certainly, the
rhetoric and symbolism of these "reforms" has been directed at deterring adolescents as a class from crime
commission by raising the perceived certainty and severity of punishment (see M.A. Bortner, Traditional
Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Remand of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
(1986); Simon Singer and David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New
York Juvenile Offender law, 22 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW (1988). Yet criminal court punishments for
adolescents, like their older cohorts, are accorded to individuals, usually within a discretionary sentencing
scheme with broad boundaries that govern the upper and lower limits of confinement. For example, waiver
statutes rarely achieve more than a symbolic role in reform, limited from larger impacts by their low base
rate and uncertain outcomes in the criminal court (see Jeffrey Fagan and E. Piper Deschenes, Deteminants
of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY (1990); DEAN J. CHAMPION AND G. LARRY M AYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL
COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991)).
17
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These developments reflect the presumption in modern juvenile justice law that
those who commit crimes and are remanded to the criminal court, or even those who are
charged with such crimes, are fully culpable for their acts. 25 This legal threshold clashes
with emerging empirical evidence on the immaturity of adolescents with respect to both
their ability to make informed and nuanced jud gments about their behavior, and their
moral development. 26 By ignoring these indicia of reduced culpability, the new transfer
or waiver policies offend the common law doctrine of incapacity.
Accordingly, demands for harsher punishment of adolescents are based on
perceptions of a "leniency gap" – that is, that juveniles committing serious crimes are
punished less severely in the juvenile court due to constrained punishment options. 27
These constraints include fewer custodial placements, shorter custodial sentences, and
more permissive conditions of release on parole. It is not clear, though, whether such a
leniency gap exists. Both equivocal empirical evidence and contrasting theories of felony
case processing lead to contradictory predictions about the severity of punishment
awaiting adolescents transferred from juvenile to criminal court. Early research on
juveniles prosecuted in criminal courts suggested that juveniles may appear less serious
in the "stream of cases"28 in criminal court in contrast to older, more experienced
offenders. The juvenile usually had less time to accumulate a record in the criminal
justice process; as a result, the most restrictive sentences are reserved for older
defendants who are viewed as more "dangerous". 29 Furthermore, the adolescent
defendant's age could lead judges to impose less severe sanctions, due in part to the
potential dangers to the youth of incarceration in an adult prison.
But the offense-based criminal court also may be inclined to view serious juvenile
crime as a threat to public safety and deserving of the most severe sanctions. Some
research with chronic violent adolescents adjudicated as adults suggests that they indeed
are treated with equal or greater severity as those who remain in juvenile court, 30 based
simply on the severity of their offenses. In juvenile court, the tension between
punishment and treatment may mitigate sentence severity. 31 Though violent offenders in
juvenile court are the most serious cases before the court, the traditional emphasis on
rehabilitation, together with administrative and statutory limitations on sanction length or
25

Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 590 (2000).Elizabeth
Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 291, 307 (Thomas Grisso & Robert
Schwartz eds., 2000).
26
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors
in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 253– 56 (1996).; Elizabeth Cauffman, and
Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents’ Judgement and Culpability, in YOUTH ON TRIAL : A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 325, 333 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds.,
2000).
27
PETER GREENWOOD ET AL ., FACTORS A FFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG A DULT OFFENDERS
(1984); James C. Howell, Juvenile Transfers to the Criminal Justice System: State of the Art 18 LAW &
POLICY (1996) 25.
28
ROBERT EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS (1969)
29
Martin Roysher and Peter Edelman, Treating Juveniles as Adults in New York: What Does it Mean and
How is it Working?, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981); Greenwood et al.
supra note 27
30
Eg. Cary Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment, 32 CRIME & DELINQ.
75 (1986). See the following section for a more detailed description of studies reaching this conclusion.
31
Jeffrey Fagan, “Punishment or Treatment for Adolescent Offenders? Therapeutic Integrity and the
Paradoxical Effects of Punishment.” 18 Quinnipiac Law Review 502, 1999.
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severity, suggests that they may be treated less harshly than similar youth in criminal
court.
What happens to adolescents once placed in the criminal justice system is the
focus of this article. The pace of change, the severity of the new laws, the potential for
unintended negative outcomes, and the empirical reality of adult punishment of juvenile
offenders creates new urgency to this question. We begin with a review of prior empirical
comparisons of punishment in juvenile versus criminal court. Most studies that have
addressed the question of a “leniency gap” have several weaknesses and limited
reliability. Most focus on only judicial waiver, yet this mecha nism is responsible for less
than 10% of the adolescents who wind up in criminal court32 . Other mechanisms that
account for far more adolescents in criminal court, such as legislative exclusion or a
lowered overall boundary of criminal court culpability, have received little attention by
researchers comparing dispositions across court types33 . Moreover, if discretionary
transfer provisions such as judicial waiver operate as intended by weeding out the most
serious juvenile offenders for prosecution as adults, then this selection bias would distort
comparisons of outcomes in juvenile and criminal courts. In addition, the inconsistencies
and ambiguities of results from these previous research efforts necessitate further
evaluation.
Then, we address this issue by reporting results of a natural experiment that
compares the certainty, celerity, and severity of sanctions for adolescents charged with
violent crimes and adjudicated in the juvenile court or criminal court. We compare
punitiveness in legal decision making for adolescents aged 15 and 16 who are charged
with serious felonies and whose cases are adjudicated in the criminal court in New York
City, with a matched sample of case adjudicated in the juvenile court in three counties in
northeastern New Jersey. We compare case outcomes in juvenile and criminal court at
three stages of case processing: pretrial detention, disposition (including conviction and
sentencing), and the length of custodial sentences imposed.
Jurisdictional differences in a single metropolitan area create conditions that allow
for a natural experiment. 34 In New Jersey, nearly all offenders ages 15 and 16 remain in
the juvenile court, while these cases are adjudicated in the adult (criminal) courts in New
York City. 35 In New York, adolescents are charged as adults at age 15 under the New
York Juvenile Offender Law if they commit specific crimes and the statutory age of
majority is 16 in New York. 36 Thus we compare cases of similar offenders in adjacent
32

Howell supra note 27.
For exceptions, see Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile versus Criminal Court
Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POLICY (1996); Singer supra note
3
34
See, for example, Mercer Sullivan, GETTING PAID: YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY (1989),
and Phillippe Bourgois, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT : SELLING CRACK IN EL BARRIO (1995) (showing the
diffusion of crime networks and markets across state borders in the New York City metropolitan area,
including counties in both New York City and northeastern New Jersey where transportation networks
facilitate travel across state borders for criminal activity).
35
We use the term ‘criminal court’ throughout this paper to refer to adult court, as opposed to juvenile
court. It should be noted that within New York’s criminal court system, there is a distinction between the
misdemeanor ‘criminal court’ and the felony ‘supreme court’. We use the term criminal court to mean this
entire court system, and not specifically the lower court.
36
New York Juvenile Offender Law, supra note 3. N.Y. Penal Law ' 30.00 Infancy provides:
1. Except as provided in subdivision two of this section, a person less than sixteen years old is not
criminally responsible for conduct.
2. A person thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminal responsible for acts constituting murder in
33
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states who are prosecuted as juveniles in one state (New Jersey) and as adults in the other
(New York). The article concludes by reviewing the implications of harsher punishment
in the criminal court for adolescent offenders on law, jurisprudence and social policy.

II. IS THERE A LENIENCY GAP?
Few studies have studied the effects of statutes and administrative laws that
relocate juvenile offenders to the criminal court, and few studies specifically have
examined whether jurisdictional transfer from juvenile to criminal court produces the
intended outcomes of harsher and more certain punishment. These few published studies
have reported equivocal results with regard to whether adolescents in criminal court
receive more certain or severe punishment than adolescents in juvenile court. Some early
research suggests that juveniles may appear less serious in the "stream of cases" in
criminal court in contrast to older, more experienced offenders. 37 A greater number of
studies, however, have found that youth transferred to criminal court are convicted and
incarcerated more often than youth in juvenile court. Yet this general result largely may
reflect a selection process whereby only fairly serious cases are chosen for waiver to
criminal court by prosecutors and/or judges. Such findings beg the question of whether
those very cases would also have received similarly severe dispositions had they been
retained in the juvenile court. 38 To determine whether the criminal court is itself more
punitive than the juvenile court requires comparisons of cour t responses to equivalent
cases. 39
A. National Statistics

the second degree . . . ; and a person fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts
constituting the crimes . . . . [of] kidnapping in the first degree; . . . arson in the first degree; . . . assault in
the first degree; . . . manslaughter in the first degree; . . . rape in the first degree; . . . sodomy in the first
degree; . . . aggravated sexual abuse; . . . . burglary in the first degree; . . . burglary in the second degree; . .
. arson in the second degree; . . . . robbery in the first degree; . . . robbery in the second degree . . . ; or . . .
an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the first degree.
37
See supra notes 27, 28. See also I. Sagatun et al., The Effect of Transfers from Juvenile to Criminal
Court: A Loglinear Analysis, 8 CRIME AND JUSTICE (1985); Kristine Kinder et al., A comparison of the
Dispositions of Juvenile Offenders Certified as Adults with Juvenile Offenders Not Certified, JUVENILE AND
FAMILY COURT JOURNAL (1995).
38
To the extent that sentence lengths in criminal court exceed those available in juvenile court, particularly
for youth with only a short time remaining until the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the criminal court
will be more punitive (see e.g Donna Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, in
CRIME AND JUSTICE : AN A NNUAL REVIEW (Michael Tonry ed. 2000; Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier,
Consequences of Transfer in FAGAN & ZIMRING supra note 1). However, states are increasingly
experimenting with blended sentencing and other ways of extending the juvenile court jurisdiction at
sentencing (see Richard E. Redding and James C. Howell, supra note 15), which may partly eliminate this
effect.
39
See, e.g., PETER GREENWOOD ET AL ., AGE CRIME AND SANCTIONS: THE TRANSITION FROM JUVENILE TO
A DULT COURT (1980); Peter Greenwood, Differences in Criminal Behavior and Court Responses Among
Juvenile and Young Adult Defendants, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE (Michael Tonry and Normal Morris eds.,
1986); Joel Eigen, Punishing Youth Homicide Offenders in Philadelphia, 72 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
AND CRIMINOLOGY (1981); Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision:
Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (1987); Barry C. Feld, supra
note 5.
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We begin by examining recent national statistics to consider the general trend of
greater punitiveness for youth in the criminal court, and whether this is due largely to
differences between the cases processed in juvenile and criminal courts. Strom, Smith &
Snyder 40 present case processing statistics for juveniles (below age 18) in both juvenile
and criminal courts from the 75 largest counties in the country, during 1990, 1992, and
1994. We sho w some of their findings in Table 1. The first result shown concerns the
aggregate distribution of arrest charges in the two courts. Overall, juvenile court cases
are considerably less violent than those of youth in the criminal court. Of defendants at
least fifteen years old in juvenile court, only 22% were charged with violent offenses and
46% with property offenses. In contrast, in the criminal court, 66% were charged with
violent offenses and 17% with property offenses.
This disparity among types of cases in each court affects detention, conviction,
and sentencing rates. Overall, the juvenile court detained only 35% at any time prior to
disposition, while the criminal court detained 49% of the defendants from arrest until
disposition. Yet stratifying cases rather grossly on the most serious charge and separately
examining violent, property, and drug offenses reveals that this disparity is due mostly to
different treatment of violent offenders (43% vs. 56% are detained, though detention rates
are similar for property and drug cases). We also find that criminal courts convict41 at a
slightly higher rate than the juvenile court (59% vs. 55%). This difference generally holds
for each charge type, and is actually somewhat larger for drug offenses.
At sentencing, juvenile court residential placements could be compared either to
adult prison sentences only, or to both adult jail and prison sentences. Because the
distinction between jail and prison largely turns on sentence length (less than vs. more
than a year), both are comparable to some juvenile court residential placements. The data
from Strom et al. permit us to compare the adult incarceration rate both with and without
jail sentences. If we include jail sentences in the criminal court’s incarceration rate, then
the overall rate is considerably higher than the juvenile court rate (68% vs. 40%). While
this difference is largest for violent offenses, the criminal court incarcerates more often
for each charge type. If criminal court incarceration is restricted instead to prison
sentences, then the overall criminal court imprisonment rate still remains higher than the
juvenile court’s incarceration rate (49% vs. 40%), but the difference is limited to violent
offenses (68% vs. 44%), and even reverses for drug offenses.
Table 1 considers data aggregated across the various legal mechanisms by which
juveniles appear in criminal court (i.e., judicial waiver, prosecutorial election, legislative
exclusion). Most of those mechanisms require individuals to select more violent, serious,
and/or chronically offending youth for transfer to the criminal court. In contrast, when
state law sets the overall age of criminal majority below eighteen, no discretionary
transfer decisions are made. In these states, some adolescents younger than 18 are
considered adults by definition42 , not by any discretionary selection process. Because the
40

KEVIN STROM ET AL., JUVENILE FELONY DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURTS (1998). These reports use
data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics from the 75 most populous U.S. counties in its biennial
State Court Processing Statistics program.
41
For ease of exposition, we use the turn “conviction” in describing both juvenile and criminal court
outcomes, although technically the juvenile court adjudicates rather than convicts.
42
Youth can be adults ‘by definition’ by virtue of a lower overall threshold for criminal age of majority.
Most states maintain the age of 18 as their age of criminal majority, 8 states use age 17, and 3 use age 16.
However, even when statutes set an age threshold for specific offenses, police and prosecutors can
influence whether the offender falls above or below the offense threshold for transfer by exercising
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cases of such youth who are adults by definition are not restricted to serious offenses or
chronic offenders, the dispositions of these cases might be more similar to dispositions of
juvenile court cases, and less like the dispositions of youths whose cases are more serious
and therefore transferred to the criminal court via other (discretionary) mechanisms.
Table 1. Charges and Dispositions for Youth in Juvenile and Criminal court, 1990,
1992, and 1994 (% of All Cases)
All
Violent
Property
Drug
Cases Offenses Offenses
Offenses
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Charge Distribution
Juvenile Court
100
22
46
13

Detained
Convicted

Incarcerated in Jail or
Prison

Criminal court

100

51

21

15

Juvenile Court

35

43

29

40

Criminal court

49

56

26

37

Juvenile Court

55

51

55

55

Criminal court

59

56

61

68

Juvenile Court

40

44

35

41

Criminal court:
prison sentences

49

68

32

34

Criminal court: jail
or prison sentences

68

79

57

50

Source: Strom et al., supra note 40, Tables 6-11, 13.
Note: Juvenile court cases are limited to offenders 15 years of age or older; charge distributions are at
conviction; detention in juvenile court is at any time and for any length of time before disposition, but in
criminal court continuously until disposition, which somewhat inflates the relative juvenile court rate;
incarceration is only of those convicted. Only three charge categories are shown, therefore the percentages
within court jurisdiction are less than 100%.

Table 2 shows trends identified by Brown and Langan43 comparing dispositions in
states where adolescents reach the age of majority below 18 by statute (and are excluded
from juvenile court), with states where adolescents are transferred to adult courts by
discretionary decisions of judges or prosecutors. Brown and Langan estimate that of
youth who were adults by definition and convicted of felonies in 1994, only 28% were
convicted of violent offenses and 31% of property offenses. In contrast, most of the
juveniles transferred to criminal court were convicted of violent offenses (53%) and 24%
discretion in charging. For example, a robbery in the second degree for an offender age 14 falls under the
New York Juvenile Offender Law, while a third degree robbery for the same person is a juvenile offense.
The characteristics of second versus third degree robbery involve subjective criteria such as the degree of
force used, giving wide berth to police and prosecutors to steer cases toward the juvenile or criminal court.
43
JODI M. BROWN AND PATRICK A. LANGAN, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1994
(1998). These estimates are based on data from another Bureau of Justice Statistics bienniel statistics
program, the National Judicial Reporting Program, based on a sample of all felony sentences in state courts.
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were convicted of property offenses. By comparison, only 19% of convicted adults (over
18) were convicted of a violent offense and 32% of a property offense. Thus, the cases of
youth transferred to the criminal court seem to stand out for their severity, involving
more violent offenses than the cases of youth who are adults by definition, the overall
adult felony caseload, or the overall juvenile court caseload (22%, shown earlier in table
1).
Not surprisingly, when convicted, the transferred youth receive prison sentences
more often than youth who are adults by definition (63% vs. 54%), or adults in general
(46%). This difference largely results from the differing charge distributions. When we
look separately at violent, property, or drug offenses, these sentencing disparities are
greatly diminished (e.g., 78% vs. 73% received prison sentences for violent offenses). 44
These national aggregates suggest that the criminal court is more punitive to
juveniles in general than is the juvenile court. At the same time, we see that much of that
punitiveness is due to the selection of more serious cases for transfer to the criminal
court, and the resulting differing charge distributions. Within charge categories, we find
much smaller differences. Though these selection effects can be partially controlled by
looking within charges, it is hard to match cases well using national figures. Such
aggregates include cases across many different localities, which vary in criminal and
juvenile justice policies and practices. These localities may have nonequivalent offense
definitions or charge distributions, and may report to the national statistics program at
different rates, among other difficulties. To determine whether the criminal court is more
punitive than the juvenile court for equivalent cases, therefore, requires more local
studies, which can focus more carefully on and calibrate these comparisons.

44

DAVID J. LEVIN ET AL., STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1996 (2000) report similar
results for the next biennial survey, for 1996 cases. The overall difference between youth transferred and
youth punished as adults by definition in somewhat larger (60% vs. 37% prison sentences, respectively).
Again, this difference seems largely attributable to the different charge distributions, so that sentences were
similar for violent or drug offenses. However, in 1996, youth who were adults be definition seem to
receive considerably less imprisonment than earlier (down from 47% to 18% receiving prison sentences),
with the result that transferred property offenders seem to receive relatively more punitive sentences (46%
prison).
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Table 2. Incarceration in Criminal Court, 1994
All Cases
(%)
Charge
Distribution

Prison Sentences
Only

Jail or Prison
Sentences

11

All Adult Felony
Convictions

100

Violent
Offenses
(%)
19

Property
Offenses
(%)
32

Drug
Offenses
(%)
31

Under 18 and
Adults by Statute

100

28

31

24

Youth Transferred
to Criminal Court
Adults over 18

100

53

24

13

46

62

42

43

Under 18 and
Adults by Statute

54

73

47

47

Youth Transferred
to Criminal Court
Adults over 18

63

78

42

45

72

83

70

71

Under 18 and
Adults by Statute

66

77

62

56

Youth Transferred
to Criminal Court

80

88

65

70

Source: Brown & Langan supra note 43, Tables 1.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5.
Note: Cases limited to those convicted in criminal court. Percentages in specific charge categories do not
add to 100% since they are subsets of all offenses.

B. Local Studies of Cases Filed for Waiver
In local or single jurisdiction studies, it is especially clear that local decision
makers select some cases for transfer while retaining others, with the intent of
transferring a different set of cases to criminal court than the cases retained in the
juvenile court. 45 We limit our review of local studies to those using conservative
strategies to control for selection bias. 46
45

How serious a methodological problem these selection effects pose depends on the local realities of
transfer. For example, Charles Frazier, Deep End Juvenile Placement or Transfer to Adult Court by Direct
File? (1991), found little difference between the cases selected for prosecutorial waiver to retained cases in
Florida. See also Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier, Prosecutorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable
Reform, 35 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (1989); Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to
Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ,
ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, (1991).
46
For more comprehensive reviews, see Donna Bishop, supra note 38; Bishop & Frazier supra note 38;

PROPORTIONALITY AND TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS

12

Researchers studying this process usually control for selection bias in judicial or
prosecutorial transfer by limiting the comparison group of juvenile court cases to the
most serious cases, making make them more comparable to the generally more serious
(transferred) criminal court cases. One strategy is to limit comparisons only to cases that
were considered for transfer to criminal court. Criminal court treatment of cases that
were in fact transferred is then compared to the juvenile court treatment of those cases
that were considered for transfer but ultimately retained in juvenile court. This narrows
considerably the range of cases to be compared, controlling for much of the selection
bias.
Such studies generally find criminal courts to be more punitive, although not
without exception. For example, Rudman et al. 47 examined cases considered for transfer
between 1980 and 1984 in three jurisdictions, Boston, Newark, and Phoenix. They report
that over 90% of cases in their sample considered for transfer were convicted, regardless
of whether cases were in fact transferred to criminal court; however, the criminal court
imposed longer sentences than did the juvenile court. Barnes & Franz48 examined all the
cases considered for transfer in a large metropolitan county in northern California
between March 1978 and December 1983. They found that person offenses received
harsher sentences in criminal court than in juvenile court, but that property offenses were
treated more leniently in criminal court. Podkopacz and Feld 49 examined cases
considered for transfer in Hennepin County, Minnesota, from 1986 through 1992, and
also controlled for many case characteristics using multivariate statistical procedures.
They found that transferred cases were more likely to be convicted than cases retained by
the juvenile court, and generally received longer sentences as well.
Lanza-Kaduce et al. 50 utilized another strategy to control selection bias. For each
of 475 cases transferred to the Florida criminal court in 1995 or 1996, a matching case
was identified in the juvenile court with equivalent current offense, number of charges,
criminal history, and demographics. Outcomes were then compared for the pairs of cases.
Fewer cases were disposed and sentenced in juvenile court than in criminal court (325 vs.
395, or 68% vs. 83%). Of those sentenced, the juvenile court made fewer residential
placements (153, or 47%) than the criminal court (247, or 63%, jail and/or prison).
Fagan51 examined the effects of the New York model relatively soon after
enactment of the Juvenile Offender Law 52 , which excludes certain adolescents from
juvenile court. In studying the outcomes of 1981-1982 cases, he took advantage of a
natural experiment afforded by the state line (the Hudson River) running through the
larger New York City metropolitan area. Because New Jersey retains a traditional system
Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, in CRIME AND
JUSTICE : A N A NNUAL REVIEW (Micael Tonry ed. 1998); Howell, supra note 27.
47
Cary Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment, 32 CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY (1986).
48
Carole W. Barnes and Randal S. Franz, Questionably Adult: Determinants and Effects of the Juvenile
Waiver Decision, 6 JUSTICE QUARTERLY, (1989).
49
Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz and Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Waiver, 86 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMNOLOGY (1996).
50
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., JUVENILE TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT STUDY : FINAL REPORT , (2002).
Table 2.4.
51
Fagan supra note 33. Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Advantage of
Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, in SERIOUS,
VIOLENT AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A SOURCEBOOK (James C. Howell et al. eds., 1995)
52
supra note 36.
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in which eighteen is the age of criminal responsibility, and the primary waiver
mechanism to criminal court is judicial waiver, Fagan was able to compare conviction
and sentencing rates (as well as recidivism, not summarized here) of comparable cases
across the state line. Such comparisons across the jurisdictional boundary are largely
immune to the selection bias that arises when decision-makers select serious cases for the
criminal court, because cases cannot migrate from the criminal court (in NY) to the
juvenile court (in NJ). 53
Fagan examined first-degree burglary and robbery cases of 15- and 16-year-olds.
Two hundred criminal court cases were sampled from each of two New York counties
(Kings [Brooklyn] and Queens), and 200 juvenile court cases from each of two New
Jersey counties (Essex and Passaic). For robbery cases, the juvenile court convicted
adolescents less often than the criminal court (46% vs. 57%), and the juvenile court then
imposed incarceration less often than the criminal court (18% vs. 46%). For burglary
cases, conviction rates in the two courts were similar, but the juvenile court imposed
incarceration less often (24% vs. 47%) 54 .
In sum, the prior research comparing punishments in juvenile and criminal courts
is equivocal. Though some studies find that a leniency gap exists whereby youth in
juvenile court are treated more leniently than those in criminal court, others do not reach
this conclusion. Many of these studies are limited by the difficulty of finding suitable
cases for comparison across the two types of courts.

III. A NATURAL EXPERIMENT ON THE PUNISHMENT OF ADOLESCENTS
A. Study Design
This study is a replication and extension of Fagan’s earlier cross-jurisdictional
comparison of adolescent felony case processing in New York versus New Jersey, 55
using cases approximately ten years later, in 1992-1993. 56 We compare punishments
53

Cases were sampled from the population of filed cases. In principle, judicial waiver may reduce the
severity of the New Jersey cases retained in the juvenile court , and reverse waiver is possible for the 15year-olds in the New York sample. However, very few cases – only 3.3% of the robbery cases and none of
the burglary cases in his sample were waived. Fagan supra note 33, footnote 11.
54
There have been several other empirical studies of the effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law,
though few have examined the certainty, severity or celerity of punishment before and after its passage in
1978. Simon Singer and David McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the
Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW (1988); Roysher and Edelman supra note 29; George
E. Hairstone, Black Crime and the New York State Juvenile Offender Law: A Consideration of the Effects of
Lowering the Age of Criminal Responsibility in Hall et al. (1981).
55
Fagan supra note 33.
56
Within-jurisdictional comparisons of New York City’s juvenile vs. criminal court during the same time
period are reported in Akiva Liberman and Laura Winterfield, CASE PROCESSING OF JUVENILE A RRESTS IN
NEW YORK CITY’S A DULT AND JUVENILE COURTS DURING FISCAL YEAR 1992 (1996) , and Akiva
Liberman and William Raleigh, Specialized Court Parts for Juvenile Offenders in New York City’s Adult
Felony Courts: Case Processing in 1994-1995 and 1995-1996, Paper presented at 1998 Annual Conference
of the American Society of Criminology. Liberman and Winterfield found that the criminal court was more
punitive than the juvenile court over its entire caseload. Liberman and Raleigh restricted juvenile court
cases to those comparable to the criminal court cases on age and charge (i.e., 14- and 15-year-olds arrested
on ‘Juvenile Offender’ eligible charges), and also examined robbery cases alone, which comprise more
than half of the criminal court caseload. A higher proportion of cases were formally prosecuted (filed) in
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received by adolescents (ages 15-16) charged in three of New York City's criminal courts
to a matched sample of cases adjudicated in the juvenile court in three adjacent counties
in northeastern New Jersey. This replication extends the previous study in three ways: it
adds another county to each state sample, it doubles the sample size from each county,
and also broadens the eligible offenses to include youths charged with first or second
degree aggravated assault.
1. Statutory Contexts
New York’s statute governing jurisdiction of adolescent offenders provides fertile
ground for comparing outcomes of cases in juvenile and criminal courts. Sixteen is the
age for criminal responsibility in New York. In 1978, New York became the first state to
mandate legis latively the automatic transfer of youth accused of serious offenses to
criminal court. 57 New York lowered the age of criminal responsibility by excluding from
Family (juvenile) Court jurisdiction the “designated felony” list of 17 felony crimes –
various categories of robbery, burglary, assault, rape, and kidnapping – committed by
fourteen and fifteen year olds, as well as murder by youths thirteen or older. 58 Because
the legislative definition excludes these ages and offenses from Family Court jurisdiction,
those cases originate in adult criminal court and include criminal procedural safeguards
such as indictment, bail and public hearings. As a result, youths automatically are
processed in the criminal justice system prior to any determination of their suitability for
treatment in the Family Court. These adolescents who are prosecuted in the criminal
court are referred to as ‘Juvenile Offenders’. Youths convicted and sentenced as Juvenile
Offenders receive determinate sentences with mandatory terms in secure facilities and for
periods substantially longer than the five-year maximum term for juvenile “designated
felons”59 Although prosecution of Juvenile Offenders originates in adult criminal court,
provisions exist for prosecutors and criminal court judges to “remove” or “remand” these
Juvenile Offender cases to Family Court prior to indictment, before trial, or for
sentencing following criminal conviction. 60 Despite these “reverse waiver” or transfer
back provisions, New York’s Juvenile Offender law has been called “the toughest

the criminal court than in the juvenile court system, (88% vs. 50%; or 88% vs. 48% for robberies alone),
and that the criminal court detained more cases pretrial than the juvenile court (48% vs. 18%; or 41% vs.
15% for robberies alone). However, these within-jurisdictional results were more ambiguous at conviction
and sentencing.
57
1978 N.Y. Laws. Ch. 478 § 2. Juvenile Offender Law offenses include murder & attempted murder 2°,
arson 1° & 2°, kidnapping & attempted kidnapping 1°, manslaughter 1°, rape 1°, robbery 1° & 2°, burglary
1° & 2°, sodomy 1°, aggravated sexual abuse, firearms use 1°, and assault 1°& 2°. The background and
context of this legislation is described in SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY (1996);
BUTTERFIELD, FOX, ALL GOD’S CHILDREN: THE BOSKETT FAMILY AND THE A MERICAN TRADITION OF
VIOLENCE (1995); and Simon I. Singer et al., The Reproduction of Juvenile Justice in Criminal Court: A
Case Study of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law in FAGAN & ZIMRING, supra note 1.
58
1978 N.Y. Laws. Ch. 478 § 2. See id for specific offenses. Initially, there were 12 offenses on this list
of designated felonies, but it has since grown to 17 by legislative amendments. ERIC W ARNER, THE
JUVENILE OFFENDER HANDBOOK (2000).
59
Judges may depart from prescribed the sentencing ranges if they reclassify the offender as a ‘Youthful
Offender’, a distinct dispositional category that is not considered an official conviction; but for this
reclassification to proceed, the offender must not have any previous convictions for any ‘designated felony’
offenses. ‘Youthful Offender’ status entails a sealed record, and allows a judge to depart from sentencing
guidelines to give the defendant a non-custodial sentence. N.Y. Penal Laws § 70.05.
60
N.Y. Penal Laws § 60.10.
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juvenile offender law in the country,”61 “this nation’s toughest law dealing with children
accused of committing certain violent felony offenses,”62 and “among the most severe in
the country by initiating prosecution in the adult courts and providing for longer
sentences.”63
Until the early 1980s, the New Jersey juvenile code subscribed to the traditional,
rehabilitative model of juvenile justice. From its inception in 1929, children charged as
“delinquents” (i.e., accused of criminal or status offenses) who were below the age of 16
(amended to 18 in 1952) were adjudicated under the jurisdiction of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts. 64 In 1970, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed in State
v. L.N. that “[t]he philosophy of our juvenile court system is aimed at rehabilitation
through reformation and education in order to restore a delinquent youth to a position of
responsible citizenship”. 65 In 1973, the state removed status offenders from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 66
But in 1982, the New Jersey legislature enacted a new Juvenile Code effective on
September 1, 1983, that recognized the dual purposes of juvenile courts:
This bill recognizes that the public welfare and the best interests of juveniles can
be served most effectively though an approach which provides for harsher
penalties for juveniles who commit serious acts or who hare repetitive offenders,
while broadening family responsibility and the use of alternative dispositions for
juveniles committing less serious offenses. . . . 67
The new legislation included “tougher” delinquency sentencing and waiver provisions,
and permitted the use of short term incarceration, not to exceed sixty days, to deter future
offending. 68 The new law also created a presumption for secure confinement in the
juvenile system for youths charged with serious crimes such as murder, rape, and
robbery. 69 The New Jersey juvenile code authorizes substantial sentences for the most
serious crimes and proportionally shorter sentences for less serious offenses. 70
61

Lucia Beadel Whisenand and Edward J. McLaughlin, “Completing the Cycle: Reality and the Juvenile
Justice System in New York State.” 47 Albany Law Review 1,1 (1982).
62
Alison Marie Grinnell, “Searching for a Solution: The Future of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law,” 16
New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 635, 636 (2000).
63
Roysher and Edelman, supra note 29, at 266.
64
N.J.Stat.Ann. §2A:4-2 (1952), and N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:4-14 (Permanent edition 1952). The original
1929 statute also gave jurisdiction of this juvenile court over youths charged as disorderly persons,
vagrants, incorrigibles, immoral, truant, “growing up in idleness” or “who deported herself so as to
endanger her morals, health or general welfare.” See 1929 N.J. Laws ch 157.
65
(109 N.J. Super.278, 286-87, 263 A.2d 150, 154-55 (App.Div.), aff’d per curiam, 57 N.J. 165, 270A.2d
409 (1970)).
66
The state created a separate jurisdictional category of “juveniles in need of supervision” (JINS) –
children under eighteen years of age who committed non-criminal acts such as incorrigibility, truancy, and
disobedience. See, Laws of 1973, ch. 306; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4-43(a) & 45 (West Cum. Supp. 1981.
The legal separation of status offenses and delinquency also included a prohibition on the secure detention
and institutional confinement of status offenders.
67
Senate Judiciary Committee Statement No. 641-L1982, c. 77. See, also, New Jersey Assembly Bills
Nos. 641-45 (Jan. 19, 1982).
68
New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2A:4 - 24 (c).
69
New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2A:4 – 25.
70
In addition, the legislation provides for periods of incarceration beyond the statutory maximum if a
juvenile is convicted of a crime of the first, second, or third degree, has two prior convictions of crimes of
the first or second degree, and has been committed previously to a correctional facility (N.J. Stat. Ann. §
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Because the new code strengthened substantially the delinquency sentencing
options, the legislature anticipated that reliance on discretionary transfer to criminal court
might decrease. 71 At the same time, the code substantially revised the transfer provisions
by creating a presumption for transfer for youths charged with certain serious offenses –
e.g., homicide, robbery and arson – and putting the burden of proof on them to
demonstrate their amenability to treatment within the juvenile system by the age of
nineteen, rather than the previous dispositional maximum of age twenty one. 72 Despite
these conditions promoting judicial transfer, the incidence of transfer remains low in New
Jersey, and continues to remain low to the present day. 73
The sharply differing jurisdictional boundary for adolescent felony offenders
between New York and New Jersey, coupled with their geographical contiguity and
shared social ecology, creates the conditions to conduct a natural experiment. Instead of
randomization of cases, the geographical border establishes contrasting jurisidictional
conditions for the adjudication of adolescent felony offenders.
2. Selecting Counties within States
In New York, three counties supplied cases for the study: Kings (Brooklyn),
Bronx and Queens Counties. In New Jersey, cases were sampled from from Essex,
Hudson and Passaic Counties. These six counties are part of a large metropolitan SMSA
and are interrelated economically, in transportation, media and culture, and in major
social institutions such as educational institutions and medical centers. Matching criteria
for counties included demographic, socio-economic, labor force, and housing
characteristics. According to 1990 census data, these counties are well matched regarding
rates of unemployment, poverty, female-headed households, and residential mobility. 74
Moreover, the crime problems among juveniles and young adults in these communities
are comparable relative to other counties in their states and to each other. 75 Each county
was among the top five counties in the state in their contributions to the state's prison
population and in the state's homicide fatalities. 76 When the cases were sampled, each
state was experiencing over-crowding in its adult correctional facilities. Each county has
2A:4A - 44(3)). In fact, the statutes include a sentencing table that operates as a sentencing guideline
system. See, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-44(d)(1). In addition, youths with prior convictions who are convicted
of murder may have their 20-year term extended by five years. Youths with prior records who are
convicted of other crimes of the first, second, or third degree may have their maximum sentence extended
by an additional two years. The release of juveniles on parole prior to the completion of at least one-third
of their sentence requires the approval of the sentencing court (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-44(d)(2)).
71
“Practically, this presumption [for juvenile imprisonment for serious offenses], may encourage less
dependency on waiver of a juvenile to the adult court, because of some assurance that the juvenile
committing a serious crime would possibly receive a more appropriate disposition in the juvenile system
(Senate Judiciary Committee Statement L. 1982, c. 77:222).”
72
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4- (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
73
Fagan, Comparative Impacts of Juvenile and Criminal Court Sanctions, supra note 33; Wayne S. Fisher,
Juvenile Waivers to Adult Court: A Report to the New Jersey Legislature (1985); Bruce Stout, The Impact
of the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice, (1987). In the New Jersey sample in this study, 1.2 % of the
cases were transferred to criminal court. These cases are included in the New Jersey sample for all
following analyses.
74
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CITY AND COUNTY DATA BOOK (1994). These data are based on projections of
1990 U.S. Census data. We used 1994 estimates as the closest time point to the point of origin of the cases.
75
Mercer Sullivan, GETTING PAID (1989).
76
Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile and Criminal Court Sanctions on Adolescent
Felony Offenders, Report to the National Institute of Justice (1991).
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a local incarceration facility for adults (New York City counties share the Rikers Island
facility), and local juvenile and adult detention facilities (New York City’s five boroughs
share beds in the city's juvenile detention system). Each has a well-developed indigent
defender system for juveniles and adults.
Crime markets and criminal activity in this metropolitan region also often span
county and state lines, suggesting a homogeneity of crime problems that also strengthens
the experimental design. Drug markets in this region, for example, include regional
territory and exchanges, with sellers and buyers moving across counties and at times
across state lines. 77 Adolescent and young adult crime, then, are part of a redistributive
process within a regional informal and illicit economy.
3. Selecting Charge Categories
We sampled cases where adolescents aged 15 and 16 were charged with felony
robbbery, assault, or burglary. These three types of crimes are recurrent criminological
events that are paradigm cases representing two faces of the debate in defining juvenile
jurisdiction. Robbery and assault events comprise the prototypical violent juvenile
crimes which have evoked fear of crime as well as legislative action in the past decade 78 .
Adolescent burglary offenses encompass a broader, more complex and at times persistent
pattern of crimes that are recurring challenges to judicial responses to juvenile crime.
While their offenses may be considered less serious than violent offenders, property
offenders with long prior records pose a different type of challenge to the perceived
legitimacy and efficacy of the juvenile court, a challenge that also has animated the
policy initiatives to narrow or eliminate the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Property
offenders comprise a large proportion of incarcerated juveniles in each state and also
those transferred to criminal court, 79 illustrating their importance in the policy debate on
the juvenile court.
The distinct age-specific jurisdictional boundaries for these offenses contribute to
the experimental design. In New York, under the Juvenile Offender Law, cases alleging
felony robbery (1o and 2o ), aggravated assault (1o and 2o ) and burglary (1o ) charges for
14- and 15-year-old defendants originate in criminal court. 80 Although original
jurisdiction is criminal court, the criminal court judge may transfer cases to the juvenile
court. The age of majority in New York is 16, so no such reverse waiver is possible for
the 16-year-olds in our sample. 81 In New Jersey, initial jurisdiction is in the juvenile
court until 18 years of age, although transfer to criminal court is permitted at age 13.
Accordingly, at the time of the this study, all charges against 15- and 16-year old
77

Robert Jackall, W ILD COWBOYS (1997); Phillippe Bourgois, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT : SELLING CRACK IN
EL BARRIO (1995).
78
Barry Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79
M INNESOTA LAW REVIEW (1995); A. Miller and L. Ohlin, The politics of secure care, in VIOLENT
JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A N A NTHOLOGY (Mathidas et al. eds., 1984).
79
Hamparian et al., supra note 6; Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, in 17 CRIME
AND JUSTICE : A N A NNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, (Tonry, ed, 1993).
80
Supra note 57.
81
In order to prevent any selection bias with regard to the 15-year olds in the current sample who may be
transferred to New York juvenile court, we have retained in our dataset all such cases. There are 146 of the
407 15-year-olds in New York who were formally transferred to juvenile court. They are included in the
New York sample in all following analyses.
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defendants are adjudicated in the juvenile court, unless judicially waived to the criminal
court. However, very few youths are transferred 82 .
4. Selecting Cases
We used a multi-stage stratified random sampling procedure to select cases. First,
a population of eligible cases was identified for each county based on the case and charge
criteria. Second, cases were selected based on their representation by age, sex and
offense within each county. This procedure generated a sample of N= 2382 adolescents
aged 15-16 and charged with the specified penal code violations between January 1, 1992
and December 31, 1993. Cases were selected after charges were filed in court – at
Supreme Court indictment (the felony court) in New York, and upon filing of juvenile
court petitions in New Jersey. This selection procedure insured that only cases which
have passed a probable cause determination (i.e., a legal sufficiency determination) in
each court are included in the sample. Juvenile Offender cases in New York are
originally heard in the Criminal Court (the court of general jurisdiction) in New York
City. They are arraigned there and, if indicted, they are arraigned again in the Supreme
Court, the felony jurisdiction for New York, and adjudicated there. In New Jersey,
petitions are screened initially by court intake officers simultaneously with prosecutorial
screening for legal sufficiency. This procedure avoided sample attrition at the outset
from prosecutorial screening or dismissals prior to arraignment.
5. Data Sources
New Jersey data for Hudson County were provided in automated format by the
New Jersey Administrative Office of Courts. For the other two New Jersey counties, data
were manually collected at the county courthouses from case files of sampled individuals.
These data were supplemented by adult records provided by the New Jersey State Police.
New York data were provided by the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, the city’s
pretrial services agency, which collects and stores data on all New York City criminal
defendants. The New York data were supplemented by data from the New York
Department of Criminal Justice Services, including data concerning cases waived from
the criminal court down to New York family court.
6. Sample Description
Table 3 compares the demographic, legal and offense characteristics of the
sampled cases. Though the cases from each state are similar along most dimensions,
cases differ by state in a few important ways. The New York (criminal court) sample
consists of greater percentages of 16- year olds, minority defendants and male defendants
than in New Jersey (juvenile court). In the New Jersey sample a greater percentage of
individuals have prior arrest records, are arrested during sampled case processing, and
have arrest warrants issued by a judge during case processing. All variables are included
as control variables in the following analyses to prevent the introduction of a sample
selection bias.
82

Supra note 73
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Another noticeable difference between samples is the distribution of arrest
charges. The New Jersey cases are nearly equally divided among the three sampled
charges, though the New York cases consist of mostly robbery arrests. This is the result
of the sampling procedure – cases were selected based on their representation within each
state’s court system. Thus, sample differences result from natural variation between the
two populations sampled. This sampling method included the most serious 15- and 16year old offenders in each state other than adolescents arrested for homicide or sexual
assault. It should be noted that though they involve different behaviors, most first degree
aggravated assault and first degree robbery are of equal severity within each
jurisdiction83 . Again, we include arrest charges as control variables in all analyses, as
well as analyze the data separately by arrest charge.

83

In New York all of the most serious robberies and aggravated assaults are considered B felony charges
and are thus of equal severity. In New Jersey, most robberies of greatest severity are considered 2nd degree
offenses, as are all aggravated assaults of the greatest severity. However, robberies may be 1st degree
offenses in New Jersey and thus a more severe classification than that of the most severe assault charges,
though such charges are very rarely filed.
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Table 3. Sample Characteristics by State
New Jersey
(n=1061)

New York
(n=1321)

15
16

46.9
53.1

30.8
69.2

Female
Male

17.1
82.9

11.8
88.2

White
African-American
Hispanic
Asian
Other and Unknown

13.3
54.8
26.1
0.2
5.6

4.9
58.0
32.2
1.4
3.5

Charge
% Robbery
% Aggravated Assault
% Burglary

25.4
43.4
31.1

80.3
15.2
4.5

% Ever Detained by Court

41.4

47.0

% Warrant Ordered by Court

18.6

7.9

% With Associated Weapon Charge

34.9

41.4

% With Prior Arrest Record
Mean # of Prior Arrests
Mean # of Prior Convictions

67.0
5.6
3.1

45.0
2.4
1.1

% Rearrested During Case Processing
Mean # of Rearrests During Case
Processing

37.1
1.9

16.3
1.3

Age:

Sex

Race

B. Measures and Variables
1. Independent Variables
We collected data that were uniformly available and similarly measured across
states. The resultant set of independent variables is more detailed and extensive than

20
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many prior studies examining court outcomes. 84 Table 4 shows the domains of
information and specific variables within each.

Table 4. Independent Variables
Domain

Measure

Demographic
Characteristics of Defendant

Age
Sex (dummy variable for female)
Ethnicity (dummy variables for African American, White,
Hispanic, and All Other Ethnicities)
County of Residence
Charge (most serious at court filing)
Associated Weapon Charge (indicating weapon used in
offense)
Number of Prior Arrests (logged)
Number of Arrests During Case Processing (labeled
concurrent arrests - logged)
Prior Incarceratio ns
Warrants Issued During Sample Case
Detained During Case Processing
Case Processing Time (months)
Juvenile (New Jersey) or Criminal (New York)

Offense

Offender

Case Processing

Court Jurisdiction

2. Dependent Variables
To compare punishments in juvenile and criminal court, we examine three
dependent variables: detention during case processing, disposition, and length of
incarceration for those sentenced to jail or prison.
Pretrial detention is an important predictor of future court outcomes 85 , and a
substantive punishment. 86 Defendants who are remanded pretrial may be more likely to
plea guilty in order to either gain immediate freedom from jail, or to begin receiving
‘credit’ for their time spent in custody. 87 We use a dichotomous measure to indicate
whether the defendant was detained at any point between court filing or initial hearing
and sentencing or final disposition.

84

For reviews see Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence
with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 A MERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (1981), Darrell
Steffensmeier and Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts: Who Is
Punished More Harshly?, 65 A MERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (2000).
85
S EE M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT (1982).
86
M ALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979); JONATHAN CASPER, A MERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1972).
87
Often defendants detained pretrial are incarcerated for long terms, and may not have this time count
towards their eventual prison sentences.
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To reconcile procedural differences and disparities among dispositional categories
across the two court jurisdictions, we constructed a four- level categorical variable rather
than a dichotomous variable indicating conviction. For example, both jurisdictions offer
a similar disposition, titled “adjourned in contemplation of dismissal” in New York and
“adjourned disposition” in New Jersey, in which cases are monitored for 6 to 12 months
and dropped with no further court action if the defendant is not re-arrested. However, to
be eligible for this a defendant must plead guilty and hence be convicted in New Jersey,
but not so in New York where a defendant is still considered innocent when this
disposition is ordered. The categorical variable used here groups similar dispositions that
may have different official classifications regarding the convicted vs. not convicted
dichotomy. The resultant variable includes the following categories: not convicted or
diverted from court; being given a review period (such as being adjourned in
contemplation of dismissal); convicted and given a fine, probation, or alternative to
detention; and incarceration.
Custodial sentence length among New Jersey cases were computed from actual
release dates from the records of the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission. We
estimated custodial sentence lengths for New York cases as 2/3 of the maximum sentence
given by the sentencing judge. This estimate was used on advice of staff at the New
York City Criminal Justice Agency, by whom the sentencing data were supplied. 88

C. Data Analytic Strategy
To estimate differences in the use of detention, we first look at bivariate
comparisions of detention rates by state, prior arrest record, and arrest charge. Next, we
estimate three logistic regression equations of detention. Logistic regression is used
because the dependent variable is dichotomous. 89 The first regression equation includes
all relevant independent variables; the second model adds interaction terms of state by
each arrest charge 90 to test if the predictor variables have state-specific effects. The third
model is restricted to robbery cases, in order to limit our comparisons to a smaller group
of more homogenous and noteworthy cases.
We use a similar strategy to estimate differences by state in dispositions. We
examine bivariate relationships between states in dispositions, and by arrest charge and
prior record within and between states. Then we estimate a Heckman two-stage probit
regression equation on the likelihood of incarceration to determine whether state predicts
incarceration when controlling for all other independent variables. Heckman two-stage
models are used because any model predicting sentencing practices includes a censored
sample, in that only convicted cases are included in models with sentencing as the
dependent variable 91 . The Heckman two-stage model produces parameter estimates that
88

Personal communication with Mary Philips, Criminal Justice Agency Researcher.
G.S. Maddala, LIMITED DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS (1983).
90
We include two interaction terms: state x aggravated assault charge, and state x burglary charge.
Robbery charges are excluded as a contrast variable, as is appropriate when working with series of dummy
variables.
91
Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 A MERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (1983); Richard Breen, REGRESSION M ODELS: CENSORED, SAMPLE SELECTED, OR
TRUNCATED DATA (1996).
89
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take into account censoring for those cases where there was no finding of guilt or
delinquency. In the two-stage model, a censoring parameter is estimated and then
incorporated into the probit analysis of the dependent variable. 92 Probit analyses are used
because the dependent variable is dichotomous. 93 The models include a robust cluster by
county, which adjusts the standard error of each coefficient to account for any systematic
differences among cases from each of the six included counties 94 . As we did with the
detention analyses, we estimate three multivariate models predicting incarceration: a full
sample model with no interaction terms; a full sample model with interaction terms of
state by arrest charge (one for state by burglary, and one for state by aggravated assault);
and a robbery only model.
Our comparison of sentence lengths is somewhat more constrained than the
previous two comparisons. Because the statutes guiding custodial sentence lengths in
each state are different from one another, it would be meaningless to model this as a
dependent variable in a multivariate model. Thus, we graphically display the relative
distribution of sentences in each state, among cases that resulted in incarceration. We
present the percentages of incarcerated cases falling into each sentence length category
rather than the actual number of cases in each category. This is due to the greater number
of incarcerated cases in New York; as a result the frequencies of sentences are on
different scales in the two states and need to be adjusted to show relative distributions.
For ease of comparison, we group the sentence length values into ranges that allow for a
more coherent graphical presentation.

IV. RESULTS
A. Detention
Table 5 displays the numbers and percentages of cases detained overall by state,
by arrest charge within each state and by prior arrest record within each state. Overall,
detention rates are higher in the criminal court cases in New York compared to the
juvenile court cases in New Jersey (47.1% versus 41.4%). Detention rates are
comparable for robbery cases but differ by state for burglary and assault cases. Detention
rates for youths with prior records are similar across states. The likelihood of being
92

There is some debate over whether to correct for sample selection (see Greene id). This paper does so
because conviction decisions may be based on quality of evidence rather than on other factors related to
sentencing (see VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE , FELONY A RRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN
NEW YORK CITY’S COURTS (1977)). Thus the question of what factors predict incarceration is relevant for
the entire sample of arrestees, as it tells us what factors lead to incarceration regardless of the factors that
lead to conviction. By correcting for a truncated sample the results can be generalized to the entire sample,
and not just to the portion of the sample that resulted in conviction. In addition, most research on court
sentencing has used the two-stage sample selection bias correction method or variations thereof (eg. see
Darrell Steffensmeier and Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Court:
Who is Punished More Harshly, 65 A MERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (2000); JEFFERY ULMER, SOCIAL
W ORLDS OF SENTENCING (1997)).
93
See, generally, Michael Finkelstein and Bruce Levin, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS (2nd edition)(2001);
Peter Kennedy, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS (1993); William Greene, ECONOMETRIC A NALYSIS (4th
edition) (2000). All the Heckman two-stage models are performed in STATA 7 statistical package. Other
analyses are performed in SPSS 10.0.
94
Only the results of the second stage of the Heckman two-stage model are reported, the prediction of a
custodial sentence.
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detained is augmented by a prior record in both states, and the disparity between the
overall state detention rates remains when splitting the sample into those with and
without prior records.

Table 5. Detention by State, Charge and Prior Arrest Record
New Jersey
N
%
Overall Detention Rate

New York
N
%

439

41.4%

622

47.1%

Robbery Cases

138

51.1%

536

50.5%

Aggravated Assault Cases

182

39.5%

59

29.4%

Burglary Cases

119

36.1%

27

45.8%

Detention by Arrest Charge:

Detention By Presence by Prior Arrest Record:
No Prior Record

71

20.3%

232

31.9%

Prior Arrest Record

368

51.8%

390

65.7%

These results suggest that arrest charge and prior record are important predictors
of pretrial detention, as is jurisdiction. To test the combinations of offense and offender
characteristics that predict detention, we estimate logistic regression models with all
predictors included. Model 1 in Table 6 shows that variables related to severity of
offense and prior record of the offender are significant predictors of detention, including:
weapon charge, arrest warrant, prior arrests, concurrent arrests and a history of
incarceration. Both burglary and aggravated assault cases are less likely to be detained
than robbery cases. We control for offender demographic characteristics, several of
which are significant: males are more likely to be detained than females, and whites less
likely than African-Americans, net of all other variables. After controlling for offense
and offender characteristics, cases originating in the criminal court in New York are
significantly more likely to be detained.
We next include two interaction terms to examine whether specific charges were
more or less likely to result in detention within states and re-estimated this model. Model
2 in Table 6 shows that the results are unchanged by the addition of the two interaction
terms. The two interaction terms do not significantly improve the model’s fit, and neither
one is a significant predictor on its own. Finally, we estimate separate regression models
each of the three offense categories. Model 3 in Table 6 shows results for robbery, the
largest offense category. The coefficient for state is positive in all three of these offensespecific models, though at varying levels of significance 95 . This pattern of results again
95

Results of the aggravated assault and burglary models are available on request. In sum, state was highly
significant among robbery cases (p=.006), moderately significant for burglary cases (p=.046), and not
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shows that New York criminal courts are more likely to detain defendants pretrial, after
controlling for all other offense and offender factors.
In sum, we find that detention is reserved for more serious cases and cases with
defendants of lengthy prior offending histories, that females and whites are less likely to
be detained than males or any minorities, and that prosecution in criminal court leads to a
greater likelihood of detention relative to prosecution in juvenile court. Thus with regard
to “front-end” punishment at this first stage of case processing, we find a leniency gap
between juvenile and criminal courts.

statistically significant for aggravated assault cases (p=.276).
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Table 6. Logistic Regression on Detention
Model 1
Main Effects
B
Exp (B)
Age

-0.002

Model 2
Interactions
B Exp (B)

Model 3
Robbery Only

B Exp (B)

0.998

0.006

1.006

0.021

1.021

0.509 ***

1.663

0.520 ***

1.682

0.826 ***

2.284

White

-0.745 ***

0.475

-0.730 ***

0.482

-0.354

0.702

Hispanic

-0.060

0.942

-0.062

0.940

0.024

1.025

0.031

1.032

0.021

1.021

0.009

1.009

0.650

-0.298

0.742

0.414

-0.918

2.635

1.075 ***

2.929

1.521

0.109

1.115

Sex (Contrast=Female)
Ethnicity (Contrast=African American)

Other Ethnicity
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Burglary

-0.431 **
-0.881

***

Associated Weapon Charge

0.975

***

Arrest Warrant

0.418 **

Aggravated Assault

0.883

***

# Concurrent Arrests (logged)

0.705

***

History of Incarceration

0.939 ***

# Prior Arrests (logged)

Case Length (in days, logged)
State (Contrast=New Jersey)

0.008
0.436

State x Burglary Charge
State x Aggravated Assault Charge
Constant
Model Statistics
Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
p(Chi-Square)
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

2.651

0.969

1.518

0.419 **
0.881

***

2.024

0.704

***

2.023

0.496

2.556

0.930 ***

2.535

0.931 ***

2.418

1.208
***

0.399
***

1.546

0.008

2.414

1.008

0.459

1.583

0.204

1.227

-0.335

0.715

0.892

***

2.440

**

1.643
2.536

0.024

*

1.024

0.484

**

1.622

-2.320

-2.506

-3.155

2638.010

2635.461

1553.959

617.866

620.416

306.847

0.000

0.000

0.000
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B. Disposition
Table 7 compares four categories of dispositions across the two states – not
convicted or diverted from court; being given a review period (such as being acquitted in
contemplation of dismissal); convicted and given a fine, probation, or alternative to
detention; and incarceration96 . About four in ten cases in each state are not convicted,
either by dismissal, acquittal, or diversion from court prior to any disposition. This is
fairly consistent for each arrest charge.
There are substantial state-level differences among results in the three sentencing
categories. New Jersey juvenile courts are more likely than New York criminal courts to
impose either a review period or a non-custodial sanction. Youths in the criminal court in
New York are more likely to be incarcerated overall, and for each offense category. 97
Youths charged with burglary in New York are nearly seven times more likely to be
incarcerated compared to New Jersey cases. We find these differences despite the
“reverse waiver” provisions in New York that result in the return of 146 defendants to the
Family Court for sentencing 98 .
Table 7 shows that sanction certainty is no more likely in the criminal court
compared to the juvenile court. But the severity of punishment – specifically, the use of
incarceration compared to less restrictive forms of punishment –is far greater in the
criminal court. Courts in New York are more likely to impose custodial sanctions
relative to periods of non-custodial supervision or community sentences. Once again, we
observe that the criminal courts appear to be fa r more punitive.

96

We include cases not convicted as a dispositional category. See Section III for an explanation of the
construction of this measure.
97
The only divergent arrest charge category is aggravated assault. Contrary to results for the other charge
categories, for assaults cases New York criminal courts are somewhat more likely than New Jersey juvenile
courts to not convict or to impose a review period. However, consistent with the other results, New York is
still somewhat more likely than New Jersey to incarcerate assault cases.
98
Supra note 81.
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Table 7. Conviction and Sentencing by State and Charge
Not Convicted
or Diverted

Review Period

Fine - ATD Probation Incarceration

NJ

NY

NJ

NY

NJ

NY

NJ

NY

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

39.1

39.2

15.1

11.2

37.9

25.8

7.9

23.8

Robbery Cases

40.0

38.0

14.9

8.8

33.7

27.1

11.4

26.1

Aggravated Assault Cases

44.9

47.7

15.0

23.3

31.8

18.8

8.4

10.2

Burglary Cases

30.6

32.7

15.5

14.3

49.5

24.5

4.4

28.6

All Cases
By Arrest Charge

We test these results with a Heckman two-stage probit regression on likelihood of
incarceration among those who are convicted. As model 1 in table 8 displays, several
variables predict increased likelihood of incarceration. Most of the variables relating to
offense severity and severity of prior record are significant. Specifically, incarceration is
more likely when: (a) there is an associated weapon charge, (b) the defendant has a
longer record of prior arrests, (c) there are concurrent arrests, (d) the defendant has
previously been incarcerated, and (e) the defendant was detained during the course of
adjudication. In addition, adolescents arrested for aggravated assault and for burglary are
less likely to be incarcerated than those arrested for robbery. The coefficient for state
was positive and significant; net of all other factors, being prosecuted in New York leads
to a greater likelihood of incarceration than prosecution in New Jersey.
Model 2 in table 7 adds two interaction terms to model 1, state by each included
arrest charge category (state x aggravated assault and state x burglary, with robbery
excluded as a contrast variable). Though one of these variables, state as a function of a
burglary charge, is a significant predictor of incarceration, adding them to the model fails
to improve the model fit (p>.10). Thus, the interaction terms do not enhance our ability
to predict incarceration over a main effects model99 .

99

A separate model was also estimated using an interaction term of state by number of prior arrests. The
addition of this variable did improve the model fit, though the results were not robust. Results in a related
paper, using similar data, demonstrate a lack of significance for a set of variables including state by prior
arrests (Aaron Kupchik Legal Rationality and Jurisdictional Transfer: Comparing Sentencing of
Adolescents in Juvenile and Criminal Courts, n.d.), despite significance for this individual variable. Thus
prior record may have a different impact in the two states, but this does not appear to be robust.
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Model 3 returns to the main effects analysis, but includes only robbery cases in
the analysis in order to eliminate the effect of different charge distributions in the two
states. Overall, the results of model 3 mirror those of model 1, suggesting that similar
factors shape the decision to incarcerate for robbery cases and for the entire sample. In
both models, the best predictors of incarceration are state, a history of incarceration, and
arrests during case processing (concurrent arrests). Coefficients for sex and age variables
do attain significance in model 3, but their effects are only marginally larger than in
model 1.
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Table 8. Heckman Two-Stage Censored Probit Regression of Incarceration
by Offense, Offender and Jurisdictional Factors
Model 1

Model 2

Main Effects
B
z
Age
Sex (Contrast=Female)

-0.069

-1.69

Model 3

Interactions
B
z
-0.075

-1.72

Robbery Only
B
z
-0.125 *
*

-2.00

0.285

1.71

0.293

1.68

0.470

1.98

-0.104

-0.87

-0.079

-0.63

0.282

0.90

0.064

0.65

0.060

0.60

0.024

0.15

-0.069

-0.41

-0.077

-0.45

-0.121

-0.66

-0.176 *

-2.03

-0.228 **

Ethnicity (Contrast=Afr. American)
White
Hispanic
Other Ethnicity
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault

-0.319

*

Associated Weapon Charge

0.248

**

Arrest Warrant

0.114

Burglary

0.177

*

0.281

***

History of Incarceration

0.954

***

Case Length (in months)

0.005

# Prior Arrests (logged)
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)

Detained
State (Contrast=New Jersey)

0.534

*

1.109

***

State x Aggravate d Assault

Constant
Log-likelihood
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

-0.193

-2.34

3.09

0.243

**

2.91

0.251 *

2.12

1.08

0.135

1.15

0.313

1.53

-2.10

0.189

*

0.289

***

7.38

0.947

***

0.82

0.003

2.08
5.36

2.19
8.07

0.563

*

1.149

***

-0.136

State x Burglary

-2.67

*

0.621

0.127

**

2.77

0.328

***

3.32

7.74

0.978

***

9.34

0.55

0.006

2.19

0.689

1.99
4.93

7.55

1.082

0.88
1.81
***

4.83

-0.67
***

3.19

-1.855

-1.864

-1.276

-1942.769

-1939.465

-1175.073

-1.20
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C. Sentence Length
We continue by considering sentence lengths for those who are sentenced to
prison in each state. On average, prison sentences in New York are significantly longer
than prison sentences in New Jersey; the average sentence in New York is 26.6 months,
and 18.7 months in New Jersey. This difference is statistically significant, as
demonstrated by a t-test (p<0.05).
Figure 1 clearly shows that custodial sentence lengths have very different relative
distribut ions in the two states. The results indicate that adolescents incarcerated in New
Jersey are more likely to receive a shorter prison sentence than adolescents incarcerated
in New York.
The New Jersey cases show a unimodal, positively skewed distribution. Most
cases receive sentences of less than 18 months. The cases at the high end of this
distribution are the few New Jersey cases that are waived to criminal court and convicted
there (n=10). 100 Thus most adolescents incarcerated in New Jersey’s juvenile courts
receive relatively short prison sentences. The New York distribution is more complicated
than that of New Jersey, as it shows three distinct peaks instead of one. The first peak is
similar to that of the New Jersey distribution and shows a concentration of short
sentences 101 . The second peak occurs when the New Jersey distribution tails off, at
around 24-36 months. The third peak is at 48-60 months. To investigate why cases
clustered in these three peaks, we looked for relationships among several factors. Neither
defendant’s age, the court in which the sentencing occurred (criminal, supreme or
family), or severity of offense charge at conviction could explain this clustering (tables
not shown). 102 Further research should investigate the factors that influence custodial
sentence lengths for adolescents in criminal courts.
In this third dimension of punitiveness, as in the two others, adolescent offenders
charged in criminal court jurisdiction receive harsher punishments. Once again, there is
evidence of more conservative allocation of punishment for adolescent felony offenders
in the juvenile court.

100

Supra note 53.
This may reflect jail sentences of up to one year, the result of plea bargains reducing conviction charges
to misdemeanors where incarceration is capped at one year.
102
We also tested for a relationship here between sentence length and ‘Youthful Offender’ status.
‘Youthful Offender’ status is an official sentencing option for adolescents in the New York criminal courts
supra note 59. If designated with this status, the defendant’s case is sealed and sentences are limited to
four years of incarceration. Yet this did not explain the clustering of sentence lengths, either.
101
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Figure 1. Prison Sentence Length Relative Distribution, by State
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V. CONCLUSION
Using a natural experiment, we compare matched samples of cases adjudicated in
juvenile versus criminal courts across two jurisdictions with disparate thresholds for
criminal court culpability. To determine whether juvenile transfer policies meet their
stated goals of providing more severe punishments for adolescents than would be
imposed by juvenile courts, we test whether there is a leniency gap between these two
jurisdictions. The results show that across three dimensions, criminal courts are in fact
consistently more punitive. Adolescents in criminal court are more likely to be detained
pretrial, more likely to be incarcerated, and if incarcerated, they are sentenced to longer
prison terms than similarly situated adolescents in juvenile court. Thus, we find that the
punishments for comparable adolescents in the two types of courts are consistently and
significantly greater in criminal court than in juvenile court. Moreover, we find an
incarceration rate in criminal court that is almost three times as great as the rate in
juvenile court, overall, and almost seven times as great for burglary cases in juvenile
court. We find a very wide leniency gap separating juvenile and criminal court.
Several factors contribute to the greater punitiveness of criminal courts for
adolescent offenders. The most likely is simply the statutory goal of each court, and the
jurisprudential norms expressed by these statutory goals. Most juvenile courts, including
those in New Jersey, have a dual mission of rehabilitation and punishment, 103 yet
criminal courts emphasize retribution and community protection. Without an explicit and
formal goal of rehabilitation, it is not surprising that criminal courts are more likely to
detain, convict and incarcerate youths, and once convicted, to sentence them to longer
prison terms. Another factor contributing to punitiveness in the criminal court is the
limited options for non-custodial or treatment-oriented sentencing options, a reflection
both of the disparity between the two courts’ sentencing goals, and the narrowly defined
sentencing goals in most states’ criminal codes.
Though our research confirms that transfer to criminal court results in harsh
punishment, the differential effects of this policy are seemingly less extensive than
intended by policy- makers104 . Given the relentless and urgent demands for increased
punishment for adolescents – typified by laws such as California’s Proposition 21 – it
may be surprising to some that fewer than one in four criminal court cases in our sample
resulted in incarceration. This incarceration rate, though far greater than in the juvenile
courts we study, is significantly lower than the overall felony incarceration rates for
adults we report in Table 2 above. This result may reflect enduring adherences to a childsaver ideology and to the common law principles of diminished capacity and
individualized justice for youth that survive transfer to criminal court. The diversity of
sentencing of adolescents by criminal court judges suggests that many treat adolescent
defendants as children in need of guidance rather than adult- like offenders. This diversity
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of sentencing made possible in New York criminal courts by laws that allow judges to
circumvent sentencing guidelines and give reduced sentences to certain youths 105 .
Although a “leniency gap” is evident in the severity of punishment between
juvenile and criminal court, it is possible that principles of ‘juvenile justice’ – diminished
culpability, the possibility of developmental correction and desistance – are reproduced
within the criminal courts 106 . To test this possibility, sentencing research should
compare the criteria that juvenile and criminal court judges apply in sentencing
adolescents. This research should determine the dimensions and thresholds of culpability
to which adolescent defendants actually are held in criminal courts and the extent to
which criminal court decision-makers consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor.
Moreover, future research should study the construction of institutional mechanisms to
preserve a child-saver ideology within a harsher and potentially more actuarial107 context
of criminal court. Such studies should examine whether and how the childhood
“discount” survives the jurisdictional transfer to criminal court. That is, with respect to
punitiveness toward serious adolescent offenders, juvenile and criminal courts should be
compared on their own merits and not by unidimensional categorical labels as either
“juvenile” or “criminal” court.
Juvenile courts embody the common law principles of reduced culpability for
adolescents who commit crimes. Yet in the past few decades we have seen a
proliferation of policies mandating that increased numbers of adolescents be denied the
benefit of a traditionally more rehabilitative juvenile court and held fully accountable for
crimes in criminal court. Our research shows that criminal courts to which these
adolescents are transferred are indeed more punitive than juvenile courts. However,
despite the attempts to weaken the principal of reduced culpability for adolescents, the
resilience of common law doctrine of diminished responsibility in childhood has
animated organizational adaptations and the creative exercise of discretion that seem to
defeat popular efforts to criminalize adolescent offenders. 108 These developments
105
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suggest that the century-long embrace of the common law doctrine of childhood is not
about to go away any time soon in American law.

at Maxey Boys Training Center, a program that was established for “older, violent offenders”. Christina
DeJong & Eve Schwitzer Merrill, Getting "Tough on Crime": Juvenile Waiver and the Criminal Court, 27
Ohio Northern University Law Review, 175(2001).

